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"The basic objective of investigating aircraft accidents or 
incidents is the prevention of future accidents or incidents. 
The purpose of such an investigation is not to establish guilt or 
responsibility." International Civil Aviation Organization. 
Annex 13. 
From the analysis submitted below on the investigation 
carried out by the Ministry of Transportation's Accident 
Investigating Commission, it has been concluded that the causes 
set forth in the official report do not completely reflect the 
actual events which brought about an accident with the 
characteristics and seriousness of that suffered by Spantax's 
DC-10 as it took off from Malaga Airport on September 13, 1982. 
As a result, the recommendations made in the report in order to 
avoid other similar accidents or to diminish possible damage, are 
incomplete. 
Take-Off Speeds 
In this accident, as in all those produced during take-off 
and particularly in cases of aborted operation, a careful 
analysis of the speeds at which the various accident-related 
events or actions happened is required. 
We will give a definition of the various characteristic 
take-off speeds, and the pertinent clarifications on those to be 
taken into account for this accident. 
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V 1  - Take-off decision speed. 
This speed will not be lower than the minimum speed required 
to safely carry out take-off when an engine fails suddenly during 
a take-off run. FAR 25.107(a). 
V R  - Take-off rotation speed. 
This is the speed at which pitching starts in order to climb 
and attain V2 before reaching a height of 35 feet. FAR 
25.107(e). 
VZ - Speed to be selected in order to attain at least the 
required gradient. 
(Equal to or higher than 1.2 the stall speed in take-off 
configuration or 1.1 the minimum control speed in the air). 
We will now follow the sequence of events in an aborted 
take-off due to engine failure. The aircraft advances along the 
runway gaining speed and suddenly an abnormal situation appears 
(abnormal external noise, odd reaction in the aircraft's 
attitude, etc.). The pilot keeps the aircraft centered on the 
runway and through the flight deck instrument readings verifies 
that an engine failure has occurred. Sometimes external failure 
signals are not apparent, but the engine performance readings 
issue alarm signals: temperature, oil pressure, fire alarm, etc. 
Once this happens the captain knows that if the aircraft is going 
at a speed lower than the predetermined value set prior to the 
take-off operation (so-called Vi), he may brake with the wheel 
brakes and the spoilers without having to place the working 
engines in reverse thrust (reversers actuation). "May brake" 
means that the available runway length is sufficient for the 
aircraft to stop on the runway. Should the speed attained by the 
aircraft be above Vi when an engine failure is noticed, the 
captain continues take-off maneuvers with power off, since he 
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knows that under these conditions the aircraft is able to 
complete take-off with one disabled engine but, on the other 
hand, there is not enough runway for the aircraft to brake and 
not go beyond the end of the runway. This situation would create 
a risk that would increase proportional to how much the Vi 
speed has been surpassed. 
Operation on a wet or icy runway has not been taken into 
account since it is not applicable to this accident. 
The studies made to determine Vi are based on engine 
failure and dry runway conditions. 
Engine failure of a different nature has not been 
specifically studied, but the operation criteria defined for 
engine failure are applicable to such other cases if we take into 
account that the basic Vi concept is that of a speed programmed 
as a borderline to pass from the decision to abort take-off to 
that of continuing with the maneuver. 
Flight deck failures may be more difficult to recognize due 
to lack of readings and less information and training to deal 
with these cases. This may lengthen the time elapsed from the 
moment the failure occurs to when what is happening in the 
aircraft is discovered. 
If the past history of accidents under aborted take-off is 
taken into consideration, it may be seen that in recognized 
failure which does not prevent flight and in unrecognized 
failure, take-off maneuvers should have continued once V i  was 
reached. Therefore it would seem that pilots should be 
conditioned not to attempt to abort in this situation, since 
through the accidents studied it has been confirmed that failure 
to follow the rule of taking-off once V i  has been reached has 
almost always been the wrong decision. 
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Report 
The following explanation appears in the synopsis of the 
official report: 
"Aircraft EC-DEG carrying out Spantax Flight 995 went beyond 
the end of Runway 14 of Malaga Airport (Spain), at approximately 
10.00 hours on September 13, 1982, as a result of an aborted 
take-off. Take-off acceleration was normal; no failure of the 
aircraft engines, systems, or structures was observed. The crew 
reported a very strong vibration at or near VI. When the 
captain began rotation he noticed a great increase in this 
vibration, as a result of which he aborted take-off at a speed 
somewhere in between VR and Vz. Physical evidence 
demonstrates that the tread of one retreaded nose gear wheel tire 
started coming off before the aircraft had reached VI. 
Take-off abortion was begun when 1,295 meters (4,250 ft.) of 
runway remained. The aircraft left the end of the runway at a 
speed slightly over 110 knots, crashed against an ILS concrete 
booth, then broke the airport's wire mesh fence, crossed a 
highway where it damaged three vehicles passing through, and 
finally crashed against an agricultural concrete structure. 
Engine No. 3 separated upon impact with the ILS booth. 
Approximately three-fourths of the right section and the right 
section horizontal stabilizer came off as a result of the impact 
against said agricultural structure. The fuselage also passed 
over the remnants of the structure the aircraft had hit on its 
right-hand side, finally coming to a stop some 450 meters (1,475 
ft.) away from the end of Runway 14 and approximately 40 meters 
(130 ft.) to the left of the axis. At the time the aircraft 
stopped, neither the passenger cabin nor the technical crew 
showed damage which would prevent survival. Fuel spilled from 
the right section after it collided against the agricultural 
structure, and a fire began on the aft section of the fuselage. 
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The a i r c r a f t  w a s  c o m p l e t e l y  d e s t r o y e d  b y  t h e  f i r e .  O f  t h e  381 
p a s s e n g e r s  a n d  13 c r e w  members on b o a r d ,  333  p a s s e n g e r s  a n d  c r e w  
members s u r v i v e d  a n d ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  f i r e  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  
i m p a c t ,  47 p a s s e n g e r s  a n d  3 a u x i l i a r y  crew m e m b e r s  d ied" .  
A t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ,  u n d e r  " 3 . 2  C a u s e " ,  i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  
" t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  acc iden t  was t h e  f r a c t i o n e d  d e t a c h m e n t  o f  t h e  
re t readed n o s e  gear r i g h t  whee l  t r e a d ,  w h i c h  p r o d u c e d  a s t r o n g  
v i b r a t i o n  t h a t  c o u l d  n o t  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  b y  t h e  c a p t a i n .  T h i s  l e d  
him t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  i n  
f l i g h t  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  h e  i n t e r r u p t e d  t a k e - o f f  a t  a s p e e d  a b o v e  
tt V R  . 
I n  t h e  s e c o n d  a n d  l a s t  p a r a g r a p h s  u n d e r  t h i s  t i t l e ,  t h e  
Commiss ion  e x p r e s s e s  i t s  o p i n i o n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  t a k e  o f f ,  i n  
s p i t e  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  h a v i n g  a s p e e d  a b o v e  V R :  
"The  d e c i s i o n  t o  a b a n d o n  t a k e - o f f ,  t h o u g h  i t  d o e s  n o t  comply  
w i t h  s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  i n  t h i s  case is c o n s i d e r e d  
r e a s o n a b l e  b a s e d  on t h e  abnorma l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  crew f o u n d  
i t se l f  i n ,  t h e  s h o r t  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  m a k e  a d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  l a c k  
o f  t r a i n i n g  t o  c o u n t e r  w h e e l  f a i l u r e ,  a n d  t h e  n o n e x i s t e n c e  o f  
p r o c e d u r e s  d u r i n g  t a k e - o f f  t o  h a n d l e  a n y  f a i l u r e  o t h e r  t h a n  
e n g i n e  f a i l u r e . "  
Under  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  "Recommendat ions" ,  i t  is  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  there  s h o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  "on f a i l u r e  o t h e r  t h a n  
e n g i n e  f a i l u r e . .  . , a n d  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e  V 1  p h i l o s o p h y " ;  t h e  u s e  
o f  re t readed t i r e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e g u l a t e d ,  v a r i o u s  a c t i o n s  d e s i g n e d  
t o  l e s s e n  t h e  damage t o  a i r c r a f t  l e a v i n g  t h e  runway when t a k e - o f f  
is  a b o r t e d  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n ,  a n d  e v a c u a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
p a s s a n g e r s  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a f i r e  s h o u l d  b e  improved .  
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Information on the Aircraft 
The following are some of the data supplied in the Report: 
Flaps 8" 
V i  = 162 kts IAS 
V R  = 169 kts IAS 
V2 = 182 kts IAS 
Data on nose gear treads: 
Posit ion No. of Retreading9 No. of intakes 
after last retreading 
1 
2 
4 
3 
42 
14 
A l l  the tread strip remnants found on the runway belonged to 
the tread located in position 2. 
There is no evidence of overload in either of the two treads 
or of a blowout in either wheel. 
The tread manufacturer is not recorded in the data provided. 
The section describing the investigation carried out on the tread 
breakage indicates that it w a s  a Good Year size 40 x 15.5-16, PR 
26, speed 235 MPH tread. 
Information on the Airfield 
The runway that was used is made of asphalt on concrete, 
3,200 m. long with two 75 m. stopways and a 0.2 percent 
longitudinal slope. There is an ILS localizer booth 290 meters 
from the threshold of the runway, about 22 meters to the left of 
its axis prolongation. 
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Flight Recorders 
The recording on the flight data recorder stopped when engine 
No. 3 crashed against the ILS booth. 
Fire 
It is mentioned that the aircraft had fuel on board for the 
transatlantic flight it was to carry out, but the amount is not 
given. The extinguishing agent and the amount used have not been 
reported. The degree of extinguishing action efficacy is not 
evaluated. 
Tests and Investigations 
Through research carried out b y  INTA (National Institute of 
Aerospace Technology, Spain) on pieces of the No.2 wheel tread, 
it can be established that retreading was faulty. This produced 
an abnormally low binding between layers. Other faults likewise 
attributed to an incorrect retreading process have also been 
discovered. 
Wheel No. 1 is mentioned but neither its technical 
characteristics nor its manufacturer is given. We believe it 
would be an interesting fact to know, since as a result of a 
DC-10 accident involving the blowout of a nose gear wheel at 
close to V i ,  where take-off w a s  aborted and the aircraft ran 
off the runway (Los Angeles,January 1979), the Safety Board 
recommended "to forbid that different tire models from different 
manufacturers be installed on one axle when the different 
characteristics between each tire could affect the tire loads 
under normal usage conditions (Class I, urgent measure)". 
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Though it is not specifically mentioned, apparently the two 
nose gear treads were destroyed by the fire. It is mentioned 
(point 2 . 4 )  that before leaving Palma, tire pressure was tested 
and was found to be within the required standards, but we are not 
informed whether the pressure reading was recorded or if there 
was any difference between the two tires even if they were within 
the prescribed standards. 
DFDR Study 
The study performed on the information contained in the 
flight data recorder has provided the data reflected in figures 1 
and 2 .  
Additional Information 
Under this title the report includes a series of 
considerations pertaining to the problems of identifying failures 
other than engine failure and t o  the lack of pilot training to 
face this kind of situation. 
A study on flap adjustment is submitted that advocates, from 
a safety viewpoint in the event of aborted take-off, a wider flap 
angle compatible with such limitations as operation and airport 
conditions demand. Accordingly, a wider flap angle would have 
allowed take-off at a lower speed, with the possibility of 
braking in a shorter distance or running off the runway at a 
lower speed. Nevertheless, it has been clearly established that 
the 8" angle used is correct and even recommended by the Spantax 
Flight Manual. 
Under this section the Report also submits a theoretical 
study of vibrations generated in the cabin floor by an imbalance 
of a nose gear wheel. 
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Aborted Take-Off Analysis 
Both the co-pilot who "reported the 80 and 100 kt. speeds" 
and the flight mechanic who "reported that all the engine 
parameters were correct" are mentioned here. No further 
reference is made to these crew members. 
Under this title the Report elaborates on such considerations 
as whether the decision to abort take-off was reasonable though 
V R  had already been surpassed (which implies certain accident), 
taking into account that the vibration produced once rotation for 
take-off began was a symptom unknown to the captain, leading him 
to believe that the aircraft could not be controlled. 
It must be established here that if take-off would have been 
allowed to proceed, it could have been successfully completed. 
Therefore the decision to abort the operation is significant to 
how the accident originated. 
After elaborating on the analysis of the decision to abort, 
the Report explains that the captain, as take-off was being 
interrupted, tried to return the engine gas levers and apply the 
reversers and "No.3 engine lever slipped away from him". In 
addition, "the spoilers did not come out automatically maybe 
because the reverse cycle had not been completed yet and he (the 
captain) had to bring them out manually". Spoiler operation is 
not analyzed accurately enough to find out why the spoilers did 
not automatically extend, and no data is provided to substantiate 
the statement that the Captain manually operated them. 
Likewise, no data is provided on what positive thrust value 
was maintained for  the engine, or for how long. No explanation 
is given as to why the No.3 engine reverser lever failed to work. 
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There is no study on the braking power, its decrease due to 
maintaining thrust on engine No. 3, or due to the need to correct 
the yawing effect produced by engine 3's positive thrust and the 
negative thrust of engines 1 and 2. Anti-skid performance is not 
mentioned. 
According to the distance/speed curve (fig. l), the point 
where the aircraft stopped using the three engines' maximum 
reverse thrust approximately coincides with the ILS booth's 
position (fig. 2). Therefore it may be assumed that if the 
aborted take-off maneuver had been carried out without problems, 
the aircraft would have stopped approximately in the location of 
the booth, or it would have crashed against it at well below the 
95 Km. actual impact speed. 
Evacuation Analysis 
Interesting details have been given on the slowness in 
evacuating the cabins due to the large amount of hand luggage 
picked up by the passengers before leaving the aircraft, and 
because the plane was not evacuated as a single cabin with 
various exits, but as three independent cabins, resulting in more 
serious consequences from the fire in the rear cabin as smoke 
filled up the area and carbon monoxide disabled the passengers 
and stewardesses. 
The possibility of evacuation in 90 minutes under real-life 
circumstances, having the four rear doors inoperative, is 
questioned here. 
Causes 
Instead of talking of the "cause" of the accident, as appears 
under SUMMARY in t h e  Report, the following should be specified: 
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- The event that started the accident was the fractioned 
detachment of the nose gear’s retreaded right wheel tire, 
which produced a vibration the Captain did not identify and 
led him to believe that the aircraft could not be controlled 
in flight, and therefore take-off was aborted at above V R .  
- The decision to interrupt take-off contributed to causing the 
accident. 
- Improper execution of the take-off interruption maneuver was 
probably a conditioning factor which contributed to the 
serious consequences of the accident. 
Recommendations 
Any modifications or additions we make to the recommendations 
given in the Report appear in capital letters: 
- Pilots and FLIGHT MECHANICS should be trained on malfunctions 
other than engine failure, particularly those related to 
problems with the landing gear at speeds close to V i ,  
EMPHASIZING THE DANGER OF ABORTING AT Vi OR ABOVE. 
The Vi philosophy should be reconsidered when for some 
reason braking capacity is decreased. 
- The use of retreaded tires, AND APPLICATION OF INSPECTION 
PROCEDURES FOR NEW AND RETREADED TIRES should be clearly 
regulated. 
We should recall that on October 6, 1978, on account of the 
accident which took place in Los Angeles on May 1, 1978, the 
Safety Board recommended that the FAA demand the 
non-destructive inspection o f  new and retreaded tires. 
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- CREWS SHOULD BE FURTHER TRAINED ON EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
DURING TAKE-OFF. 
Prior to this accident there had been other cases of tire 
detachment and blowout of nose gear wheels in DC-10’s. The 
conditions for dealing with this kind of failure could have 
been improved with knowledge of the previous cases. For 
example, on March 13, 1977, a Spanish-operated DC-10 had an 
incident due to detachment from the noae gear right wheel at 
V 1 ,  with alarming effects and potential risk even though 
there were no consequences (take-off was not interrupted, 
fuel was jettisoned and the aircraft landed). Therefore, we 
consider that: 
- THE TECHNICAL CREW SHOULD BE BETTER INFORMED OF INCIDENTS OR 
ACCIDENTS SUFFERED BY OTHER OPERATORS. 
The other recommendations included in the Report are: 
3) The possibility of providing the pilots with a reading in 
the flight deck which indicates the proper condition of tires 
and control surfaces should be studied. 
4) A regulation should be passed stating that all structures 
in the way of runway prolongations within the airfield, along 
a 60 meter strip on both sides of the prolongation of the 
runway axis, must be made of easily breakable material. 
5) The certification for aircraft with several cabins should 
consider the possibility of one of these cabins having to be 
evacuated when more than 50% of its exits are inoperative. 
6) Loudspeakers and other materials to be used in the event 
of evacuation should be placed next to the auxiliary crew 
seats. 
7) Crew training should be revised for cases requiring 
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. 
evacuation from wide fuselage aircraft, due to lesser 
visibility of the whole cabin, which makes coordination more 
difficult in critical situations. 
8) The personnel in charge of boarding and passengers should 
be required to strictly comply with regulations on hand 
luggage. 
9) Low flap adjustment during take-off should be avoided. 
In the Flight Manuals companies should clearly establish 
which flap adjustment is more suitable for each case. 
Study Commission on Air Safety. 
Official Institute of Aeronautical Engineers of Spain. 
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F I G *  1 - ABORTED.TAKE-OFF SPEEDS RELATIVE TO DISTANCES 1 
Key: A .  TRUE A I R S P E E D  R E L A T I V E  TO GROUND ( K N O T S )  
B .  RUNWAY 14 
C .  1) - P e a k  of v a l u e  r e g i s t e r e d  b y  v e r t i c a l  a c c e l e r o m e t e r ;  
2 )  - F i r s t  piece of t i r e ;  3)- R o t a t i o n ;  4 )  - Gas c u t - o f f  
f o r  e n g i n e s  1 and 2 ;  5) - Last p i e c e s  o f  t i r e ;  6) - 
F i r s t  b r a k i n g  s i g n a l ;  7 )  - E n g i n e s  1 a n d  2 r e v e r s e r s  
e x t e n d e d ;  8 )  - Gas c u t - o f f  f o r  e n g i n e  3; 9 )  - E n g i n e  1 
r e v e r s e r  r e t r a c t e d ;  1 0 )  - End o f  runway ;  1 1 )  - End of 
p r o t e c t i o n  z o n e ;  1 2 )  - I L S  b o o t h  ; 
D .  Vert ical  a c c e l e r o m e t e r  o s c i l l a t i o n .  
E. D I S T A N C E S  OVER RUNWAY ( 1 : 1 , 0 0 0  FT. )  1 
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EMNANT DISPERSAL SKETCH' 
Key to Sketch: 
a. 
b. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g *  
h. 
i. 
j. 
k. 
1. 
m. 
n. 
P *  
Q *  
C .  
! 
0 .  
Wheel tracks 
ILS-1" impact 
LUZ = Light 
No; 3 engine 
Water house 
BURNT AREA 
Right tailplane 
Right gear 
Right section 
Part of right tailplane 
Part of right section 
Furrow made by engine No. 1 
End of left section 
Engine No. 2 
Left section 
Part of right section 
Engine No. 1 
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